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Racial Salary Discrimination in the NBA:
2008-2009
Kyle Rehnstrom
ABSTRACT. This paper examines racial salary differences in the National Basketball
Association for the 2008-2009 season. Previous studies that used data from the mid-1980s
estimated salary premiums of between 16 and 20% for white players whose performance
was comparable to black players. A study that used data from the late-1980s to early-1990s
showed no significant salary differential between white and black players. Another study,
using data from the 1990s, found no racial discrimination in the NBA, but did find a height
premium of 7.4%. This paper will update previous studies by using more recent data to
analyze salary discrimination in the NBA. I find that nonwhite players earn approximately
$83,000 more than white players for the 2008-2009 season. Yet when I control for player
productivity and other variables, I find a significant white premium of approximately
24.5%. I also find that customer discrimination is not evident in the NBA for the 20082009 season.

I. Introduction
This paper examines racial salary discrimination in the National
Basketball Association (NBA). Racial salary discrimination is an
important aspect of labor market studies. The difficulty in determining
racial salary discrimination stems from the difficulty in measuring the
productivity of workers. The problem is solved in the professional sports
labor market because productivity measures, in the form of performance
statistics, are readily available as is salary information. Larry Kahn wrote:
Professional sports offer a unique opportunity for labor market
research. There is no research setting other than sports where we
know the name, face, and life history of every production worker
and supervisor in the industry. Total compensation packages and
performance statistics for each individual are widely available,
and we have a complete data set of worker-employer matches
over the career of each production worker and supervisor in the
industry. These statistics are much more detailed and accurate
than typical microdata samples such as the Census or the Current
Population Survey. (Kahn 2000, 75)
Kahn explained the phenomenon very well. Professional sports
1
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produce immediate data that provide the productivity measures of players
(workers). A long history of data is available for professional sports.
For the 2008-2009 NBA season, African-American players comprised
approximately 78% of the league.1 The 14 highest paid players in the
league are African-American, all of them earning greater than $17 million
in base salary. The five largest salaries for the 2008-2009 NBA season
went to Kevin Garnett ($24.75 million), Jason Kidd ($21.372 million),
Jermaine O'Neal ($21.372 million), Kobe Bryant ($21.262 million), and
Tracy McGrady ($21.13 million) (NBA.com 2009). Table 1 shows the
top 14 salaries in the NBA for the 2008-2009 season. Yet these figures
can be deceiving. Kahn and Sherer reported that the top three NBA
salaries for the 1985-1986 season also went to black players but still
found racial salary discrimination to be evident in the NBA (1988, 41).
Although the NBA appears to be a racially equal labor market, the
important question is whether racial salary discrimination is evident in the
NBA today.
TABLE 1–Top 14 Salaries in 2008-2009
Player
Kevin Garnett
Jason Kidd
Jermaine O’Neal
Kobe Bryant
Tracy McGrady
Allen Iverson
Stephon Marbury
Tim Duncan
Steve Francis
Shaquille O’Neal
Paul Pierce
Shawn Marion
Ray Allen
Rashard Lewis
Sports City, 2009

Salary
$24,750,000
$21,372,000
$21,372,000
$21,262,500
$21,126,875
$20,840,625
$20,840,625
$20,598,704
$20,024,000
$20,000,000
$18,077,095
$17,810,000
$17,388,430
$17,238,000
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NBA players are more highly visible to fans, both on the court and on
the bench, than players in other professional sports (Kahn and Sherer
1988, 41). Some suggest that there is a premium for being a white player
in the NBA. That is because white fans may be willing to pay a premium
to see white players on the team. Customer discrimination may be more
prevalent in the NBA than other sports because of the visibility and
relative scarcity of white NBA players. If salary discrimination is found
for the 2008-2009 season, is it caused by customer discrimination?

II. Salaries in the NBA
The National Basketball Players' Association (NBPA) is the NBA's labor
union. Bob Cousy organized the NBPA in 1954. It is the oldest
professional sports labor union in North America (NBPA.com 2009). The
NBPA supports the best interests of its players through the collective
bargaining process. Collective bargaining agreements set the basic rules
for salary determination. According to Kahn and Sherer, an important
collective bargaining agreement started the free agency era in 1976 (1988,
42). Free agency allows a player to sell his services in the open market
when his current contract expires. For the last quarter century, free
agency caused NBA players' salaries to increase.
The institution of a stricter salary cap has slowed players' salaries
growth (InsideHoops.com 2007). The NBA salary cap sets the total dollar
amount that teams can spend on their players' salaries during a season.
For the 2008-2009 season, the NBA salary cap was set at $58.68 million
(ESPN.com 2008). The NBA imposes a "soft" salary cap that allows
teams to go over the set salary limit (InsideHoops.com 2007). Therefore,
the salary cap is not entirely restrictive. There is, however, a tax level of
$71.15 million (ESPN.com 2008). Any team that goes beyond the tax
level must pay a tax of $1 for every $1 it exceeds the tax level
(InsideHoops.com 2007). The institutions of free agency and salary caps
have changed the salary structure of the NBA.

III. Previous Studies
Kahn and Sherer (1988) studied the NBA's wage structure using data
from 1985-1986. My study uses Kahn and Sherer's model. A variety of
performance, market, and personal measures were used in their model.

4
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They included a race variable because the study's focus was on racial
salary discrimination. Race was represented by a dummy variable. Kahn
and Sherer also included dummy variables for position. They believed the
dummy variables would control for the possible differential value of the
various NBA positions (Kahn and Sherer 1988, 46). In their research,
Kahn and Sherer found that, ceteris paribus, black players earn
approximately 20% less than white players (1988, 59). They believed the
salary discrimination against black players in the NBA stemmed from
discrimination by fans (Kahn and Sherer 1988, 60). Their results implied
that going from an all-black to an all-white team would increase home
attendance by approximately 138,000 fans (Kahn and Sherer 1988, 56).
The positive significant effect of percentage of white players on the team
illustrated customer discrimination in the NBA. The NBA has thirty
different "firms" in its industry, and firms are profit-maximizers. NBA
owners may want to have more white players on their team because more
fans will come to games. More fans increase revenue. Customer
discrimination may have led to the salary discrimination against black
players as owners bid-up the price of the best white players.
Brown et al. (1991) researched salary discrimination against black
players using performance statistics from the 1983-1984 NBA season and
salary measures from the 1984-1985 season. They used performance data
from the previous season because current salary levels depend on past
performance (Brown et al. 1991, 334). Brown et al. used performance
statistics in their model; they did not include as many explanatory
variables for performance as Kahn and Sherer (1991, 335). Also, they
excluded dummy variables for position in their model. Brown et al. found
a salary premium of approximately 16% for white players, ceteris paribus
(1991, 335). They concluded the NBA wage structure was racially biased
because black players received 16% less compensation than white players
with comparable performance (Brown et al.1991, 343). Their discovery
was later criticized by Matthew S. Dey, who believed the discrimination
was due to position played, not race (1997, 87).
Dey (1997) examined racial salary differences in the NBA for the
late-1980s to the early-1990s. Dey argued that the NBA had changed in
three important ways since the previous research. First, the NBA
expanded by four new franchises for the 1989-1990 season. Expansion
increased the demand for skilled NBA players. Second, the structure of
free agency changed. The new free agency structure gave players an
advantage in seeking the highest amount of money for their skills. Third,
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a stricter salary cap was enacted (Dey 1997, 85). The salary cap restricted
the amount of money teams could pay their players. The purpose of the
salary cap was to equalize teams in different markets (Dey 1997, 85). Dey
found no significant racial salary discrimination in the NBA. His
regression on players' lifetime NBA performance resulted in a 1%
premium paid to whites, while his regression on players' current NBA
performance resulted in a 1% premium paid to blacks (Dey 1997, 86).
Dey argued that the discrimination found by Brown et al. was possibly a
premium paid to centers and not discrimination against blacks because the
position variable was omitted in Brown et al.'s model (1997, 87). Dey
believed the NBA to be a racially equal labor market. Lack of racial
salary discrimination and changes in the NBA showed the NBA was
growing and was an example of a progressive racially equal labor market.
Hill (2004) revisited the issue of racial salary discrimination using
data from the 1990s. Hill used a model consisting of various performance
statistics, height, and a dummy variable for race. Hill believed the height
measure would account for any pay premium not captured by rebounds
and blocked shots (2004, 83). He found that the race variable was
statistically significant and indicated a 7.4% pay premium for white
players, ceteris paribus (Hill 2004, 86). When he included height in the
model, the race variable became statistically insignificant. The height
variable was statistically significant. Hill believed the correlation between
height and race created a false positive result for racial wage
discrimination (2004, 87). In conclusion, Hill reported the pay
discrimination in the NBA was a height premium and no racial salary
discrimination was present in the 1990s in the NBA (2004, 90). The NBA
was a racially equal labor market in the 1990s, unlike the mid-1980s.
Kahn and Shah (2005) investigated racial salary discrimination in the
NBA using data from the 2001-2002 NBA season. They discovered racial
salary effects among different groups of NBA players. One group suffered
nonwhite shortfalls in salary, ceteris paribus. The group consisted of
rookies not included in the rookie salary scale and players who were not
free agents (Kahn and Shah 2005, 461). The rookie salary scale defines
set salaries for players drafted in the first round of the NBA draft
regardless of position played, productivity statistics, or race. Players
drafted beyond the first round are not included in the rookie salary scale.
Players who were under the rookie salary scale and veteran free agents
did not suffer from racial salary differences (Kahn and Shah 2005, 461).
They concluded that union pay scales and competition in the free agent
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market can cause racial pay differences to disappear. Although racial
salary discrimination was evident among groups of NBA players, there
was no racial salary discrimination across the entire industry.

IV. Data
The data used in the present study include productivity statistics, personal
characteristics, NBA players' salaries, and demand- and market-related
measures. NBA productivity statistics and personal characteristics were
provided by NBA.com, the official website of the NBA. The statistics are
not based on a single season, but are career performance statistics. Career
performance statistics explain the salary level of a given player. A player
who has consistently performed well throughout his career normally
reaches a higher salary level. Player salaries for the 2008-2009 NBA
season were provided by Sports City. Sports City provides sports data on
every professional sport in North America. Demand-related data were
provided by ESPN.com. Market-related data were provided by the U.S.
Census Bureau and Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Rookies were excluded from the sample set because NBA
productivity statistics were unavailable. Rookies are NBA players drafted
out of college and are participating in their first season in the league.
Rostered players, players on the team who have not played, were also
excluded because of unavailable performance statistics. These players
receive a salary, but are located on the practice squad or injured reserve.

V. Models
My model for salary determination is based on Kahn and Sherer's model
(1988) and is of the following form:
ln S = â1 X + äR + å
where:
S = The salary of the player in 2008-2009;
X = A vector of explanatory variables;
R= Dummy variable for race (1 for white, 0 otherwise);
å = An error term.
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The vector of explanatory variables includes the following:
SEASONS =
MINS =
GP =
FT =
FG =
PTS =
CENTER =

number of years player has played in the NBA,
average career minutes played per game,
average number of games played per season,
career free throw percentage,
career field goal percentage,
career points scored per game,
dummy variable for centers (1 for center, 0
otherwise),
FORWARD = dummy variable for forwards (1 for forward, 0
otherwise),
OREB =
career offensive rebounds per game,
DREB =
career defensive rebounds per game,
ASST =
career assists per game,
FOULS =
career fouls per game,
STL =
career steals per game,
TURN =
career turnovers per game,
BLK =
career blocks per game,
POPMSA =
July 2007 population of team's Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Area,
WIN =
2007-2008 winning percentage of player's 2008-2009
team,
ATT =
2007-2008 average home attendance of player's 20082009 team
HEIGHT =
player's height measured in inches,
ALLSTAR = dummy variable for 2008 all-star appearance (1 for
all-star, 0 otherwise)
On-court player performance is measured through the shooting,
scoring, rebounding, assists, fouls, steals, blocks, and turnover statistics.
NBA player longevity is measured through the SEASONS variable. The
dummy variables for the center and forward positions are included to
control for the different values of these positions. A dominant center is
known to be a key ingredient of a championship team. These variables
allow the model to capture the physical nature of players as these
positions provide an intimidating presence on the court, which rebounds
and blocked shots are unable to do. MINS captures how a team utilizes its
players. On average, a player who is more valuable to his team will play
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more minutes per game. Games played per season measures a player's
durability throughout his career. POPMSA and ATT both measure market
related variables. Team success is measured through WIN. A team is
more likely to pay a higher salary for a player if it had success in the
previous season. HEIGHT captures advantages players have over
performance statistics such as rebounds, blocked shots, and turnovers.
Taller players cause opposing players to alter their shots or passes.
Opponents will have lower shooting percentages or increased turnovers.
ALLSTAR controls for the popularity of players because NBA fans vote
for the all-star team. The key variable in the model, WHITE, measures
whether the player is white or another race.2 Recall that the NBA differs
from other professional sports because players are highly visible to fans.
Players are perceived as light or dark skinned.3
To test for customer discrimination, I estimate a model of home
attendance for the 2008-2009 season. My model for attendance
determination is of the following form:
ATTEND = â1 + â2 WINPCT + â3 STARS + â4ARENA + â5TEAMS +
â6 PRICE + â7 PCTWHITE + â8 POPMSA + â9 RACEMSA + â10 GDPMSA
+å
where:
ATTEND =

NBA team's average home attendance for 2008-2009
season;
WINPCT =
NBA team's 2008-2009 winning percentage;
STARS =
Number of 2008-2009 all-stars on NBA team;
ARENA =
NBA team's 2008-2009 arena capacity;
TEAMS =
Number of other major league sports franchises in
NBA team's city;
PRICE =
2008-2009 average home ticket price of NBA team;
PCTWHITE = Fraction of NBA team members who are white;
POPMSA = July 2007 population of NBA team's MSA;
RACEMSA = 2007 percentage of NBA team's MSA that was
African-American;
GDPMSA = 2006 GDP of NBA team's MSA;
å=
An error term.
Estimation of the attendance determination model is a direct test of
the idea of customer discrimination. WINPCT and STARS indicate team
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fan appeal. More fans will come to games if the team is successful and
contains popular players on its roster. ARENA controls for the maximum
level of attendance. TEAMS, PRICE, POPMSA, RACEMSA, and
GDPMSA are demand-related variables. PCTWHITE measures the effect
on attendance of going from an all-black to an all-white team.

VI. Salary Regression Results
Table 2 illustrates the mean values for the sample used in the salary
regression. Nonwhite players account for 78.9% of the sample. On
average, nonwhite players earn $83,030 more than white players for the
2008-2009 NBA season. For their careers, nonwhite players score more
points per game, grab more rebounds, dish out more assists, create more
steals, and block more shots than white players.
TABLE 2–Mean Values of the Salary-Regression Sample
Variable
YEARS
MINS
GP
FT
FG
PTS
CENTER
FORWARD
OREB
DREB
ASST
FOULS
STL
TURN
BLK
WHITE
WIN
ATT
POPMSA
HEIGHT
ALLSTAR4
SALARY
1nSALARY
Sample Size

Whites
5.4675
21.444
59.164
.74130
.45827
8.2545
.31169
.41558
1.1857
2.9013
1.8584
2.1000
.59740
1.1907
.44026
1.0000
.51262
17,503
4,433,800
80.49
2
$5,447,100
15.511
77

Nonwhites
5.8021
24.159
61.545
.73077
.45442
10.024
.18403
.40972
1.2017
2.9958
2.0639
2.2076
.77708
1.4438
.48541
0.0000
.49980
17,405
5,012,170
78.85
24
$5,530,130
15.526
288
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These figures indicate nonwhite players generally perform better than
white players on the court. Nonwhite players average more blocks per
game than white players even though there are more white players playing
the center and forward position and white players are taller on average.
White players outperform nonwhite players in free throw and field goal
percentages for their career, and their teams have a higher winning
percentage. White players also draw larger home attendance. The mean
values for the sample used in the salary regression give a basis for how
white and nonwhite players have performed in their NBA careers.
Table 2 shows that nonwhite players have a salary advantage over
white players in the NBA, on average. But Table 3 shows that white
players are paid significantly more than nonwhite players in the NBA,
ceteris paribus. The first OLS regression shows a premium of
approximately 24.6% paid to white players compared to nonwhite players
with the same performance statistics. The race effect for ln (Salary) is
statistically significant at the 1% level. The second OLS regression
includes turnovers in the model. Kahn and Sherer did not include the
turnover variable in their model, but turnovers are an important
performance measure that should be included because turnovers have a
significant impact on NBA games and players' overall performance.
Turnovers should have a negative effect on salary. Including turnovers in
the model does not have any effect on the race variable, which indicates
a 24.3% white premium. Turnovers do have a negative impact on salary,
but they are not statistically significant. The race effect is still statistically
significant at the 1% level. Market measures and winning percentage are
included in the third regression. These measures do not have any effect
on the race variable. A white premium of approximately 24.4% is present.
The race effect is still statistically significant at the 1% level.
Table 2 shows that white players are 1.64 inches taller on average
than nonwhite players. Recall that Hill included height in his model. He
found race to be statistically insignificant while height was statistically
significant (Hill 2004, 85).The fourth OLS regression includes height in
the original OLS model and does not produce the same results as Hill.
Race is still significant at the 1% level while height is not statistically
significant. A white premium of approximately 23% is present. The fifth
regression includes all-star appearances in the original OLS model.
Including ALLSTAR in the model does not alter the significance of the
race variable. A white premium of approximately 25% is evident. Race
is statistically significant at the 1% level.

Explanatory
Variables

TABLE
OLS I

3–OLS Results for ln (Salary)
OLS II

OLS III

OLS IV

OLS V
12.7317***
(.4213)
.0459***
(.0141)
.0336**
(.0155)
.0068**
(.0027)
-.3644
(.3360)
.7813
(.8272)
.0534***
(.0160)
.1575
(.1430)
.0017
(.0957)
-.0245
(.0848)
-.0136
(.0544)
-.0142
(.0355)
.0978
(.0979)
.0756
(.1379)

-

-

.0521
(.1383)
.2291***
(.0821)

.0669
(.1367)
.2508***
(.0800)

WIN

-

-

-

-

ATT

-

-

-

-

POPMSA

-

-

12.8709***
(.4571)
.0459***
(.0144)
.0288*
(.0156)
.0068**
(.0028)
-.3704
(.3502)
.8034
(.8325)
.0644***
(.0209)
.1693
(.1448)
.0062
(.0969)
-.0268
(.0850)
-.0014
(.0525)
.0011
(.0468)
.0912
(.1057)
.0780
(.1387)
-.0375
(.1489)
.0720
(.1385)
.2438***
(.0813)
.0286
(.2591)
.000008
(.00002)
.000000004
(.00000008)

11.4564***
(1.5344)
.0461***
(.0142)
.0296**
(.0148)
.0068**
(.0027)
-.3288
(.3361)
.7736
(.8181)
.0584***
(.0149)
.0856
(.1805)
-.0461
(.1183)
-.0270
(.0844)
-.0042
(.0509)
.0018
(.0362)
.0854
(.0975)
.0958
(.1369)

.0646
(.1363)
.2456***
(.0795)

12.7440***
(.4324)
.0461***
(.0144)
.0288*
(.0152)
.0069**
(.0028)
-.3741
(.3483)
.7838
(.8310)
.0632***
(.0203)
.1679
(.1455)
.0069
(.0970)
-.0272
(.0846)
.0003
(.0513)
-.0007
(.0461)
.0914
(.1047)
.0788
(.1372)
-.0291
(.1479)
.0669
(.1364)
.2433***
(.0803)

-

-

HEIGHT

-

-

-

.0165
(.0190)

-

ALLSTAR

-

-

-

-

Sample Size
Adjusted R2

365
.5981

365
.5970

365
.5940

365
.5977

CONSTANT
YEARS
MINS
GP
FT
FG
PTS
CENTER
FORWARD
OREB
DREB
ASST
FOULS
STL
TURN
BLK
WHITE

12.7227***
(.4205)
.0462***
(.0142)
.0292*
(.0149)
.0069**
(.0027)
-.3602
(.3366)
.8131
(.8252)
.0608***
(.0148)
.1653
(.1435)
.0056
(.0959)
-.0277
(.0844)
-.0003
(.0514)
-.0069
(.0345)
.0855
(.0974)
.0796
(.1375)
-

NOTE -- Standard errors in parenthesis.
NOTE -- * = Significant at 10% level

.1873
(.1270)
365
.5987

NOTE -- ** = Significant at 5% level
NOTE -- *** = Significant at 1% level
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Although Table 2, with sample means, shows that nonwhite players have
a salary advantage in the NBA, as soon as individual performance is
controlled, a 24.6% white premium is evident in the NBA. The race effect
holds with the inclusion of TURN, WIN, market-related measures,
HEIGHT, and ALLSTAR.
The regression revealed additional effects on pay. The longevity of
NBA players has a significant effect on NBA players' salaries. The
YEARS variable is significant at the 1% level. According to the model,
an extra year in the NBA would result in an approximate 4.5% salary
increase, ceteris paribus. Career points scored per game also have a
significant effect on salary. An extra point scored per game would
generate an approximate salary increase of 6%, ceteris paribus. The PPG
variable is statistically significant at the 1% level. Games played per
season is significant at the 5% level and shows that an extra game played
per year would generate an approximate 0.7% increase in salary, ceteris
paribus.

VII. Attendance Regression Results
Table 4 contains the home attendance regression results. Recall that Kahn
and Sherer found PCTWHITE to have a positive significant effect on
home attendance (1988, 56). In both OLS regressions, PCTWHITE does
not have a significant effect on home attendance. The first OLS
regression shows ARENA to have a positive statistically significant effect
on home attendance. ARENA is statistically significant at the 1% level.
Due to the popularity of the NBA, 90% of arena capacity was filled for
the 2008-2009 season (ESPN.com 2009). Obviously, teams with larger
arena capacity will have larger home attendance. Therefore, I conclude
that arena capacity captures most of the variation in home attendance for
the NBA. The second OLS regression excludes ARENA and includes
PRICE in the model. PRICE captures demand for NBA tickets. Excluding
ARENA and including PRICE causes WINPCT to become statistically
significant at the 10% level. A 1% increase in winning percentage would
increase home attendance by approximately 7,500 fans, ceteris paribus.
PRICE is not statistically significant in the model. Table 4 indicates that
teams playing in large arenas and with high winning percentages have
higher home attendance.
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TABLE 4–OLS Results for ATTEND
Explanatory Variables

OLS I

OLS II

-16248.4***
(5171.64)

11118.7***
(2145.48)

WINPCT

3635.41
(2813.55)

7534.5*
(4308.6)

STARS

666.089
(540.568)

-623.475
(751.188)

ARENA

1.62175***
(.298807)

-

TEAMS

-402.093
(389.142)

365.473
(504.961)

PRICE

-

58.3448
(44.8080)

PCTWHITE

-920.436
(4035.99)

525.984
(5106.67)

POPMSA

.0003901
(.000227)

-.000246
(.000359)

RACEMSA

-.0002627
(.001144)

.0011034
(.001536)

GDPMSA

-.0017724
(.0019562)

-.001188
(.002398)

30
.5373

30
.1519

CONSTANT

Same Size
Adjusted R2
NOTE -- Standard errors in parenthesis.
NOTE -- * = Significant at 10% level
NOTE -- ** = Significant at 5% level
NOTE -- *** = Significant at 1% level

The results from the attendance determination regressions signify that the
customer discrimination found in the mid-1980s has disappeared from the
NBA for the 2008-2009 season because the coefficients on the
PCTWHITE variable are not statistically significant. Customer
discrimination is not the cause of the nonwhite shortfall in salary.
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VIII. Conclusion
Economic studies of the NBA are important as the league has a significant
place in American culture. African-American players comprise a majority
of the league. This paper has synthesized previous studies on racial salary
discrimination in the NBA and has provided empirical evidence of racial
salary discrimination in the NBA for the 2008-2009 season. Previous
studies showed racial discrimination during the 1980s in the NBA. Racial
salary discrimination disappeared during the 1990s. The results for the
2008-2009 season indicate that white NBA players earn approximately
24.6% more than nonwhite players, ceteris paribus. Although the mean
values of the sample set indicate a nonwhite advantage in salary, as soon
as all else was held equal, nonwhite players suffer a significant salary
disadvantage. These results indicate the wage structure of the NBA is
discriminatory against nonwhites. The notion of customer discrimination,
however, is not evident in the NBA for the 2008-2009 season. For the
2008-2009 season, NBA home attendance increases with larger arena
capacity and high team winning percentage. Percentage of white players
on the team is not a determinant of NBA home attendance.
The findings of the study are very similar to Kahn and Sherer (1988)
and Brown et al. (1991). Racial salary discrimination appears to be worse
in 2009 than it was in the mid-1980s.5 Dey's (1997) and Hill's (2004)
findings of racial equality in the NBA appears to have vanished. Racial
salary discrimination has reappeared in the NBA in the late-2000s. To the
casual fan, the NBA appears to be a racially equal labor market because
nonwhite players comprise a majority of the NBA, and the top salaries in
the NBA are received by nonwhite players. This fact may prevent any
suspicion that nonwhite players face salary discrimination in the NBA.
The results of the study show the NBA to be a racially discriminatory
industry.
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Endnotes
1.
2.

285 of the league’s 365 players were African-American (excluding rookies).
Two players for the 2008-2009 season are Asian (Yi Jianlian and Yao Ming) and one
player is Mexican (Eduardo Najera). 285 players in the NBA are African-American.
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3.
4.
5.

Major Themes in Economics, Spring 2009
For this study, a player is considered white if he is perceived as light skinned. A
player is nonwhite if he is perceived as darker skinned.
Instead of sample mean, I used number of all-star players that were white and
nonwhite, respectively.
White premium of approximately 24.6% for the 2008-2009 season versus 16-20%
white premiums found in the 1980s.

